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National Courts and International
Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and
Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA
BYWILLIAM S. DODGE*
Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)' marks an important development in the protection of
foreign investors within North America, not just because of its
substantive provisions, which clarify certain rules of customary
international law,2 but because it allows foreign investors to bring
claims directly against a host State in an international forum Before
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A., Yale 1986; J.D., Yale 1991. I would like to thank Ken Doroshow, Mary Kay
Kane, Dan Price, and Don Wallace for comments on an earlier draft and Armand
Roth for valuable research assistance. I should disclose that I was of counsel to the
claimants in Azinian v. Mexico, 14 ICSID REv. FOR. INV. L.J. 535 (1999), one of the
cases discussed below.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 283 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Article 1110, for example, resolves a longstanding disagreement between
Mexico and the United States over the standard of compensation for expropriations.
In a 1938 dispute over property expropriated by Mexico, U.S. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull insisted that international law required "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation (the so-called "Hull formula"), whereas the Mexican
Minister of Foreign Relations took the position that international law required only
that foreign investors be treated no less favorably than Mexican nationals. See 3
GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-65 (1942) (reprinting
diplomatic correspondence). By providing for compensation "without delay," at
"fair market value," in a G7 currency, and that is "freely transferable," see NAFTA
Art. 1110(2)-(6), 32 I.L.M. at 641-42, Article 1110 adopts the U.S. position. See
generally Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA's Provision for Compensation in the Event of
Expropriation" Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate and Effective" Standard, 31
STAN. J. INT'L L. 423 (1995).
3. See NAFTA, Chapter 11, Section B, 32 I.L.M. at 642-47. Canada, Mexico,
and the United States have each concluded Bilateral Investment Treaties with other
countries that allow foreign investors to bring claims directly against the host State in
an international forum, but there was no such treaty between any two of the parties
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NAFTA, an investor who had suffered an expropriation or other
violation of customary international law could try to sue the host
State in the courts of the investor's own country, where it might
encounter such obstacles as foreign sovereign immunity or the act of
state doctrine,' or in the courts of the host State itself, where it might
meet a hostile reception. Or the investor might seek to have its
government espouse its claim against the host State before an
international tribunal. The North American investor could not,
however, bring its claim against Canada, Mexico, or the United States
before an international tribunal directly.
Section B of Chapter Eleven changes this. It allows an investor
from a NAFTA country to submit claims against the host State that
the substantive provisions of Chapter Eleven6 have been violated to
arbitration, either on behalf of itself ' or on behalf of an enterprise
that it owns or controls.8 The arbitration is conducted either under
the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID or under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.9 Chapter Eleven states that each of the NAFTA
countries "shall provide for the enforcement of an award in its
territory"'" and, subject to the procedural limitations contained in
Article 1136, such awards are enforceable pursuant to the New York
Convention" or the Inter-American Convention on International
to NAFTA. For a list of Bilateral Investment Treaties, see
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/treaties/treaties.htm> (visited Aug. 15,2000).
4. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)
(1994) (providing exception to foreign sovereign immunity for expropriations in
violation of international law only where the property taken or property exchanged
for such property is present in the United States).
5. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6. These are contained in Chapter 11, Section A, 32 I.L.M. at 639-42. Section B
also allows a foreign investor to bring a claim that the host State has violated Article
1502(3)(a) or 1503(2) dealing with the exercise of regulatory authority by state
enterprises and monopolies.
7. NAFTA, Art. 1116,32 I.L.M. at 642-43.
8. Id. Art. 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 643. The investor should first attempt to settle the
claim through consultation or negotiation. Id. Art. 1118, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
9. Id. Art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643. Article 1120 also provides for arbitration
pursuant to the ICSID Convention itself, but only if both the host State and the
national State of the investor are parties to the Convention. Since neither Mexico
nor Canada is currently a party to the ICSID Convention, this option is not currently
available.
10. Id. Art. 1136(4), 32 I.L.M. at 646.
11. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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Commercial Arbitration.1
These provisions for direct enforcement of Chapter Eleven by an
investor against the host State raise questions about the relationship
between national courts and international arbitration. First, is an
investor required to exhaust its remedies in the courts of the host
State prior to submitting its claims to arbitration under Chapter
Eleven, thereby giving the host State an opportunity to correct any
breach of NAFTA before elevating the dispute to the international
plane? Second, assuming that the investor is not required to seek
redress in the host State's courts but chooses to do so, what effect
does the decision of the host State's courts have on a subsequent
NAFrA arbitration? Does it bind the foreign investor as res
judicata' or is the foreign investor entitled to "two bites at the
apple"? I submit that these two questions are properly considered
together because the operation of one rule may affect the other. If,
for example, a foreign investor were required to exhaust local
remedies prior to bringing a Chapter Eleven claim and if the resulting
decision were binding as res judicata, then the foreign investor would
effectively be denied the opportunity to submit its claim to
international arbitration, a result that would be plainly inconsistent
with the purpose of Chapter Eleven.14
The text of Chapter Eleven deals only obliquely with whether
local remedies must be exhausted and does not address the res
judicata effect of domestic decisions at all.15 However, one may also
look to customary international law in addressing these questions,
since Article 1131(1) provides that a NAFTA tribunal "shall decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and
12. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan.
30,1975,14 I.L.M. 336 (1975).
13. International decisions and commentators use the phrase "res judicata" to
indicate both claim preclusion and issue preclusion (which U.S. lawyers refer to as
"collateral estoppel"). See infra note 52 and accompanying text. Res judicata must
be distinguished from the international law doctrine of estoppel under which a
party's conduct may preclude it from raising a particular argument. For further
discussion of estoppel under customary international law, see D.W. Bowett, Estoppel
Before International Tribunals and Its Relation to Acquiescence, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 176 (1957); I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
468 (1958).
14. See NAFTA, Art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642 ("Section [B] establishes a
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal
treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal.").
15. See id. Art. 1121, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
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applicable rules of international law,"'" a phrase that includes rules of
customary international law.7 Thus, one may look to customary
international law as a background against which to interpret the
provisions of Chapter Eleven and as a source of law for filling any
gaps left by that agreement.
In Part I of this article, I review the customary international law
relating to the exhaustion of local remedies and the res judicata effect
of domestic decisions on international tribunals. Customary
international law requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a
foreign investor's claim may be brought before an international
tribunal (a requirement frequently referred to as the "local remedies
rule"), but holds that a domestic court's decision is not res judicata for
a subsequent international tribunal. It gives the foreign investor two
"bites at the apple" but requires it to take the domestic bite first.
Against this background, I turn in Part II to look at Chapter Eleven
of NAFTA and at Article 1121 in particular. I argue that Article
1121, which (with certain exceptions) requires a foreign investor to
waive its "right to initiate or continue [proceedings] before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party" as a
precondition to bringing a Chapter Eleven claim, is best read as
waiving the local remedies rule as a procedural requirement. With
respect to the effect of domestic court decisions, however, I argue that
Chapter Eleven tribunals should adhere to the traditional rule that
such decisions are not res judicata, though for reasons quite different
from those that support the customary international law rule.
I. Customary International Law
It is appropriate to review the customary international law rules
16. Id. Art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (emphasis added).
17. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998), 38 I.L.M.
708, 722 (1999) (applicable rules of international law under NAFTA Article 1131(1)
include the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as declaratory of customary
international law); Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico at 9 (June 2, 2000) (visited
Aug. 15, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/publicationaward.pdf>, 15
ICSID REv. FOR. INv. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2000) (same). The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides that the interpretation of a treaty
should take into account "[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). The United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention, but accepts it as a declaration of customary international law with
respect to treaty interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, Part III, Introductory Note (1986).
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concerning exhaustion of local remedies and the effect of domestic
court decisions for two reasons. First, customary international law is
relevant as the background against which Chapter Eleven must be
interpreted and as a source of rules to fill any gaps left by the text."8
Second, a review of the customary international law rules may afford
an opportunity to discern the policy considerations that lie behind
those rules, considerations which may also be relevant to the
interpretation of Chapter Eleven.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies Under Customary International Law
The local remedies rule is much older than the modern nation-
state.9 It was applied to the practice of reprisals as early as the ninth
century, was subsequently incorporated into the law of diplomatic
protection, and is today regarded as a condition of bringing a claim
before an international tribunal.2 As the International Court of
Justice stated in the Interhandel Case, "[t]he rule that local remedies
must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted
is a well-established rule of customary international law.",
2'
The "principal premise" of the local remedies rule is "that the
host or respondent State must be given the opportunity of redressing
the alleged injury."'2 In part, the rule is simply "a reflection of the
respect accorded the sovereignty of the host or respondent State,
' ' 3
but it also benefits the host State in a more tangible way by
permitting the resolution of a dispute at a lower cost and with less
18. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
19. C.F. AMERASINOHE, LocAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1990).
20. For a history of the local remedies rule, see iL at 11-29.
21. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 LCJ. 5,27 (Mar. 21).
22. AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 97; see also id. at 61-62 ("The rule that local
remedies must be exhausted recognizes the defendant State's interests, by affording
such State the opportunity to redress the wrong committed."); EDWIN M.
BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 817 (1915) (listing as
one reason for the rule that "the home government of the complaining citizen must
give the offending government an opportunity of doing justice to the injured party in
its own regular way, and thus avoid, if possible, all occasion for international
discussion"); Interhandel Case, 1959 I.C.J. at 27 ("Before resort may be had to an
international court in such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State
where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own
means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.").
23. AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 98; see also BORCHARD, supra note 22, at
817 ("[T]he right of sovereignty and independence warrants the local state in
demanding for its courts freedom from interference, on the assumption that they are
capable of doing justice.").
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publicity than an international adjudication.' Although the interests
of the host State are the primary force behind the local remedies rule,
the rule may also serve the interests of the national State of the
injured alien and the interests of international tribunals because "it
relieve[s] national States of espousing claims that might be resolved at
a lower level or which [are] unfounded and frivolous," and relieves
"international tribunals from being excessively burdened with
litigation."'
There is some division of opinion on whether an injured alien
must bring not just its domestic law claims but also its international
claims before the domestic court. There is some authority that
suggests that it must.' In the ELSI Case, however, a Chamber of the
International Court of Justice held that a U.S. investor had
sufficiently exhausted its remedies in Italian courts by challenging the
actions of the Italian government on domestic law grounds. "It is
thus apparent that the substance of the claim brought to the
adjudication of the Italian courts is essentially the claim which the
United States now brings before this Chamber," the Chamber said,
even though "[t]he arguments were different, because the municipal
court was applying Italian law, whereas this Chamber applies
international law ... ."' Whatever the nature of the claims brought
before the domestic courts, however, it is clear that the local remedies
rule is not satisfied until the injured alien has completely exhausted
its appeals and has obtained a final decision from the highest court of
the host State to which it has a right to resort.29 Failure to exhaust
local remedies may be excused only in limited circumstances, such as
when resort to the remedy would be "obviously futile.""
24. AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 71-72.
25. Id. at 67.
26. Id. at 69.
27. See Finnish Ships Arbitration (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, 1502 (1934)
("[A]II the contentions of fact and propositions of law which are brought forward by
the claimant government... must have been investigated and adjudicated upon by
the municipal Courts"); Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9,
41-42 (July 6) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (stating that French
bondholders should have raised international law claims in Norwegian courts);
AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 176 (the individual must raise at the local level any
arguments which he raises at the international level).
28. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J.
15, 45-46 (July 20).
29. Finnish Ships Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1495; AMERASINGHE, supra note 19,
at 181.
30. AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 193-94; see also BORCHARD, supra note 22,
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The rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies may, however,
be waived by international agreement' What is less clear is just how
explicit such a waiver must be. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention,
for example, unambiguously provides:
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention
shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such
arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A
Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local
administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its
consent to arbitration under this Convention.'
In other words, State parties to the ICSID Convention agree to the
resolution of investment disputes by arbitration "to the exclusion" of
domestic courts, unless the local remedies rule is expressly preserved.
The 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty is less explicit but
similarly appears not to require exhaustion of local remedies by
negative implication. Article IX(2) provides that the foreign investor
must chose "one of the following alternatives:"33 (a) local courts, (b)
previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures, or (c) international
arbitration under ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, or UNCITRAL
rules.' Exhaustion of local remedies cannot be required as a
precondition to international arbitration under the Model Treaty
because an investor's decision to go to domestic court would, under
Article IX(2), bar it from bringing its claim before an arbitral
at 821-25. International tribunals seem to have applied the futility exception strictly.
See, e.g., Finnish Ships Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1504; Norwegian Loans Case, 1957
I.C.J. at 39-42 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
31. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 251-75; see also ELSI Case, 1989 I.C.J.
at 42 (expressing "no doubt that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that
the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of that
treaty; or confirm that it shall apply").
32. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 26, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(1965).
33. 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. IX(2) (emphasis added),
reprinted in PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECrING FOREIGN
INvESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AsPECrS OF POLITICAL RISK 255,
261 (1997).
34. Article IX(3)(b) allows a foreign investor who has chosen international
arbitration to seek injunctive relief from domestic courts to preserve its rights prior to
or during the arbitral proceeding. Id. Art. IX(3)(b), reprinted in COMEAUX &
KINSELLA, supra note 33, at 261. NAFTA Article 1121 contains a similar provision,
which is discussed further below. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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tribunal. 5
In American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,' the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal read the Iran-U.S. Claims
Settlement Declaration37 as waiving the local remedies rule by
negative implication. Article II of the Declaration provided for the
establishment of the Tribunal to decide claims by nationals of one
country against the other, "whether or not filed with any court" but
excluding "claims arising under a binding contract between the
parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be
within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts." Article
VII further provided that "[c]laims referred to the arbitration tribunal
shall.., be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of
Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court., 39 The Tribunal
noted that the Claims Settlement Declaration set forth "the grounds
for excluding claims from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and a general
reservation for cases within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the
countries was not among those grounds."'  Thus, the Tribunal
reasoned, "[t]he Algiers Declarations grant jurisdiction to this
Tribunal notwithstanding that exhaustion of local remedies...
doctrines might otherwise be applicable.""'
In the ELSI Case,42 by contrast, a Chamber of the International
Court of Justice concluded that the language of the Italy-U.S.
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty was not sufficient to
waive the local remedies rule. Article XXVI of the FCN treaty
provided:
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
35. The 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty similarly barred the foreign
investor from bringing its claim before an international arbitral tribunal if it brought
suit in domestic court. 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art.
VI(3)(a)(ii), reprinted in 1 STEPHEN ZAMORA & RONALD A. BRAND, BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 655, 659-60 (1990).
36. 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96 (1983).
37. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1981).
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 11.
40. American International Group, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 102.
41. Id.
42. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J.
15 (July 20).
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interpretation or the application of this Treaty, which the
High Contracting Parties shall not satisfactorily adjust by
diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties shall agree to
settlement by some other pacific means.43
The United States argued that if the United States and Italy "had
... intended the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court to be qualified
by the local remedies rule in cases of diplomatic protection, [they]
would have used express words to that effect."'  But the Chamber
rejected this argument, finding itself "unable to accept that an
important principle of customary international law should be held to
have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making
clear an intention to do so.
'45 I
Thus, it seems that simply providing for the settlement of
disputes without any reference to domestic courts, as in the ELSI
case, is insufficient to waive the local remedies rule. However, a
reference to domestic courts may be sufficient to waive the local
remedies rule by negative implication if, for example, the treaty
reserves only some disputes to domestic courts (like the Iran-U.S.
Claims Settlement Declaration) or precludes a party who brings suit
in domestic court from bringing its claim to international arbitration
(like the 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty).
B. Res Judicata Under Customary International Law
The doctrine of res judicata is also well established as a rule of
customary international law. The Hague Permanent Court of
Arbitration held in the Pious Fund Case, "this rule [of res judicata]
applies not only to the judgments of tribunals created by the State,
but equally to arbitral sentences rendered within the limits of the
jurisdiction fixed by the compromis,"' and, as Bin Cheng observes at
the start of his comprehensive chapter on res judicata,47 "[t]here
43. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Art. XXVI, Feb. 2, 1948,
U.S.-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
44. ELSI Case, 1989 I.C.J. at 42.
45. Id.
46. Pious Fund of the Californias (Mex. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 1, 5
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1902); see also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 & 8 Concerning
the Case of the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 11, at 27 (Dec. 16)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilloti).
47. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
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seems little, if indeed any question as to res judicata being a general
principle of law or as to its applicability in international judicial
proceedings."'  Under customary international law, the doctrine of
res judicata requires that both the parties and the question at issue be
the same.49 With respect to the second of these requirements, there is
some authority suggesting that for res judicata to apply, both the
"object" (petitum) and the "grounds" (causa petendi) of the two cases
must be the same.' This would suggest that a claimant could engage
in claim splitting and avoid the res judicata effect of a prior award by
seeking a different sort of relief or by raising new grounds in support
of the same claim for relief. However, in practice, arbitral tribunals
seem not to have allowed this sort of claim splitting and have barred
claimants from raising closely related claims that they could have
raised in an earlier arbitration. 1 The customary international law
doctrine of res judicata also includes what American lawyers think of
as issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. Thus, "[e]very matter and
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 336-72 (1953).
48. Id. at 336; see also JACKSON H. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 48-51 (1926).
49. Polish Postal Service in Danzig Case, 1925 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 11, at 30 (May
16) ("[T]he doctrine of res judicata [applies when] not only the Parties but also the
matter in dispute [are] the same"); In re S.S. Newchwang (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 16 AM. J.
INT'L L. 323, 324 (1922) ("It is a well established rule of law that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only where there is identity of the parties and of the question at
issue."); Pious Fund Case, Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 5 (applying the doctrine of res
judicata where "there is not only identity of the parties to the suit, but also identity of
the subject-matter").
50. See CHENG, supra note 47, at 340 ("The second element of identification, i.e.,
question at issue, has sometimes been subdivided into the object (petitum) and the
grounds (causa petendi) of the case."); Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) at 23
(dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti) ("[W]e have here the three traditional
elements for identification, persona, petitum, causa petendi"); Trail Smelter Case
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1952 (1941) ("The three traditional elements for
identification [are]: parties, object, and cause .... ).
51. See, e.g., Delgado Case, 3 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2196, 2199 (Span.-
U.S. Claims Comm'n 1881); Danford Knowlton & Co. and Peter V. King & Co. Case,
3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 2194, 2195 (Span.-U.S. Claims Comm'n 1881); see also
CHENG, supra note 47, at 344 ("Eadem res, in the maxim bis de eadem re non sit actio,
should... be construed as the entire claim without regard to the fact whether the
various and separate items therein contained have all been presented or not."). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) ("When a valid and final
judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules
of merger or bar ... ,the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action rose.").
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point distinctly in issue in said cause, and which was directly passed
upon and determined in said decree, and which was its grounds and
basis, is concluded by said judgment."52
However, the customary international law rule of res judicata
extends only to the effect of the decision of one international tribunal
on a subsequent international tribunal. 3 The decisions of domestic
courts, by contrast, have not been given res judicata effect by
international tribunals.' As the tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia wrote,
"an international tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a
national court."5
52. Compagnie G6ndrale de l'Ordnoque (Franco-Venezuelan Mixed Claims
Comm'n 1905), JACKSON H. RALSTON & W.T.S. DOYLE, REPORT OF THE FRENCH-
VENEZUELAN MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION OF 1902, 244, 355 (1906); see also Pious
Fund Case, Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 5 ("[A]U the parts of the judgment or the
decree concerning the points debated in the litigation enlighten and mutually
supplement each other, and... they all serve to render precise the meaning and the
bearing of the dispositif and to determine the points upon which there is res judicata
and which thereafter can not be put in question.").
53. The principle is accurately stated in the Trail Smelter Case: "That the sanctity
of res judicata attaches to a final decision of an international tribunal is an essential
and settled rule of international law." Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A.
1905,1950 (1941) (emphasis added).
54. The res judicata effect of international arbitral awards in domestic courts is
governed by the New York Convention, which provides for the recognition of such
awards. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The res judicata effect of
foreign court judgments in domestic courts, in the absence of a treaty, depends on
domestic law. The majority of states in the United States have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which affords foreign money judgments
full faith and credit, in the same manner as the judgments of sister states. See
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).
55. Amco v. Indonesia (Award, Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413, 460 (1993),
sustained in relevant part, Amco v. Indonesia (Decision on the Application for
Annulment, May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509, 526-27 (1993); see also Affaire des
Chemins de Fer de Buzau-Nehoiasi (Germ. v. Rom.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1827, 1836 (1939)
("C'est dans l'ordre interne seulement que l'autorit6 de la chose jug6e par un tribunal
national trouve son application."); In re S.S. Newchwang (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 16 AM. J.
INT'L L. 323, 324 (1922) ("[T]he decision of His Majesty's Supreme Court is not in
any sense res judicata in this case, and.., the findings of the Court as to the facts
upon which liability depends are not binding upon this Tribunal"); The Orient (U.S.
v. Mex.), 3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3229, 3229-30 (1898) (decision of U.S.
commissioners under Mar. 3, 1889 act of Congress) ("It is well settled that the
decisions of a court, condemning the property of citizens of another country, are not
conclusive evidence of the justice or legality of such condemnation."); IAN
BROWNLiE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (5th ed. 1998) ("There is
no effect of res judicata from the decision of a municipal court so far as an
international jurisdiction is concerned .... "); CHENG, supra note 47, at 337, n.6
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There are at least five reasons why customary international law
has not made the decisions of domestic courts binding on
international tribunals, and it is worth pausing to consider these
reasons since they may have an impact on how the question of res
judicata should be handled under Chapter Eleven. The first reason
for denying res judicata effect to the decisions of domestic tribunals is
that the parties to the two proceedings are not identical. As Ian
Brownlie explains: "[A]Ithough the subject-matter may be
substantially the same, the parties will not be, and the issues will have
a very different aspect. In the municipal court the legal person
claiming is an individual or corporation: before an international
tribunal the claimant will be a state exercising diplomatic protection.
,,56
Second, the question at issue in the two proceedings is often
different. In the case of In re Newchwang, for example, the United
States had sued a British company for damages resulting from the
collision of a ship owned by that company and a U.S. naval vessel in a
British court of admiralty. That court held that the British ship was
"in no way to blame for the collision" and dismissed the suit.' The
British government then brought an arbitral claim on behalf of its
company against the United States for damages from the collision,
but the tribunal refused to give the court's decision res judicata effect.
"The only matter before His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court," the
tribunal observed, "was the liability of the China Navigation Co.,
Ltd., as owners of the Newchwang, whereas the question submitted to
this Tribunal is the liability of the United States Government as
(1953) ("a decision of municipal law does not constitute res judicata in international
law"); ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 34-35 (1938) ("The conclusive force of a domestic judgment is
expended in the process of creating a definitive legal relationship between a private
plaintiff and defendant. It is congenitally impotent to modify the relationship which
springs up between States when a rule of international law has been violated."). Cf.
The Phare (Fr. v. Nicar.), 5 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS
TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4870, 4871 (1898) (court of
cassation award of July 19, 1880) (rejecting plea of res judicata on the ground that "it
was the common intention of the two governments to invest the arbitral tribunal with
all power and jurisdiction.., independently of what was decided by the judicial
authority of Nicaragua .... ).
56. BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 52-53; see also Buzau-Nehoiasi Case, 3 R.I.A.A.
at 1836 ("Les Parties aux proc6dures nationale et internationale sont
diff6rentes .... ); FREEMAN, supra note 55, at 35 ("[T]he parties to the international
proceeding [are] different from the original litigants in the domestic action ...
57. In re Newchwang 16 AM. J. INT'L L. at 324.
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owners of the Saturn. Whatever, therefore, be the connection in fact
between the two questions, they are not identical.""8
A third reason, relied upon by some authorities, is the supposed
dualism of international and domestic law.59 In reality, this is just a
more general way of saying that the issues in the two cases are
different-i.e. that the domestic proceeding involved issues of
domestic law, and the international proceeding issues of international
law.W
A fourth reason is the notion that domestic tribunals may not be
sufficiently impartial in disputes between aliens and their own
governments. As the tribunal wrote in Amco v. Indonesia:
One of the reasons for instituting an international arbitration
procedure is precisely that parties-rightly or wrongly-feel
often more confident with a legal institution which is not
entirely related to one of the parties. If a national judgment
were binding on an international tribunal such a procedure
could be rendered meaningless.61
This rationale is related to the principle that no one should be the
judge in her own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa),
which Bin Cheng suggests might be sufficient reason to ignore a
58. Id. The court further noted that in the British court "the burden of proof was
on the Saturn, while before this Tribunal it is on the Newchwang." Id-
59. See CHENG, supra note 47, at 337, n.6 ("Generally... a decision of municipal
law does not constitute res judicata in international law, because of the dualism of
international law and municipal law."); Buzau-Nehoiasi Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1836
("En g6ndral, les d6cisions nationales et internationales se meuvent dans les spheres
diff6rentes."). For a discussion of dualism and monism in international law, see
BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 31-33; J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory
of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936).
60. See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 55, at 36 ("[T]he issues presented in the two
proceedings are entirely different. The local judge is deciding questions of internal
law which may or may not involve consideration of some rule of the law of nations.
But when the case comes up for arbitration between two States the only point before
the international tribunal is whether this conduct of a national court violated any
international obligation incumbent upon the State.").
61. Amco v. Indonesia (Award, Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413, 460 (1993),
sustained in relevant part, Amco v. Indonesia (Decision on the Application for
Annulment, May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509, 526-27 (1993). Cf The Orient (U.S. v.
Mex.), 3 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATEs HAS BEEN A PARTY 3229, 3231 (1898) (decision of U.S.
commissioners under Mar. 3, 1889 act of Congress) (questioning the impartiality of a
Mexican judge).
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domestic judicial decision.62
Finally (although I have seen the point made in none of the
cases), the local remedies rule seemed to require a rule that declined
to give res judicata effect to the decisions of domestic courts, because
if a claimant were required to exhaust local remedies and the decision
of the local courts were then binding on a subsequent international
tribunal, the claimant would be denied meaningful access to an
international forum.'
In short, it is well established under customary international law
that a foreign investor is required to exhaust its remedies in domestic
court before bringing its claim before an international tribunal, but
that the decision of a domestic court is not binding on a subsequent
international tribunal. Customary international law thus gives the
injured alien two "bites at the apple," but requires that it take the
domestic bite first.
H. Chapter Eleven of NAYTA
The provision of Chapter Eleven that deals most directly with
the relationship between national courts and arbitral tribunals is
Article 1121. Subsections(1)(b) and (2)(b) require, as a condition
precedent to bringing a claim before a NAFTA tribunal, that the
investor (and where applicable the injured enterprise that the
investor owns or controls)
waive their right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party,
or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with
respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged
to be a breach.., except for proceedings for injunctive,
declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the
payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or
court under the law of the disputing Party.'
62. See CHENG, supra note 47, at 357. On nemo debet esse judex in propria sua
causa, see generally id. at 279-89.
63. The U.S. Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion in dealing with the
preclusive effect of state administrative findings under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, reasoning that the Act's requirement that state remedies be
exhausted before filing a federal suit implied that the state administrative findings
should not be given preclusive effect. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
64. NAFrA, Arts. 1121(1)(b) & 1121(2)(b).
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There are several things to notice about this provision. First, it states
that a foreign investor must waive its right "to initiate or continue"
domestic court proceedings. Thus, it cannot bring a NAFTA claim
and, if unsuccessful, bring a subsequent domestic court suit.
Second, Article 1121 does not seem to prohibit a foreign investor
from reversing that order-in other words, it seems to permit a
foreign investor to bring a domestic court suit and, if unsuccessful,
bring a subsequent NAFTA claim. In this respect, Chapter Eleven
represents a departure from U.S. bilateral investment treaties, which
typically require foreign investors to choose at the outset which
dispute resolution procedures to use and preclude a foreign investor
who has brought suit in domestic court from subsequently bringing an
arbitral claim.
Third, in general, Article 1121 does not allow claim splitting,
unless the domestic proceeding is brought first. A foreign investor
must waive its right to go to domestic court "with respect to the
measure;" it may not present its international law claims to a NAFTA
tribunal and subsequently challenge the same measure in domestic
court on domestic law grounds.6 However, fourth, there is a kind of
claim splitting that is expressly permitted: a foreign investor may
bring a NAFTA claim for damages and simultaneously or
subsequently seek injunctive or declaratory relief in domestic court,
relief that a NAFTA tribunal is not capable of granting. 7
There is one further limitation on domestic court suits in Chapter
65. See 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. IX(2), reprinted in
COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 33, at 261; 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, Art. VI(3)(a)(il), reprinted in I ZAMORA & BRAND, supra note 35, at 659-60;
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
66. Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico at 17-21 (June 2, 2000) (visited Aug. 15,
2000) <http:lwww.worldbank.orglicsidlcases/publicationaward.pdf>, 15 ICSID Rnv.
FOR. INv. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2000) (holding that claimant must waive right to
challenge measure on domestic law grounds as a precondition to bringing Chapter
Eleven claim).
67. Article 1135 limits a Chapter Eleven tribunal to awarding damages, interest,
restitution, and costs. NAFTA, Art. 1135, 32 I.L.M. at 646. Article 1134 allows the
tribunal to order interim measures of protection, such as an order to preserve
evidence, but does not allow the tribunal to attach property or enjoin a measure
alleged to violate Chapter Eleven. Id. Art. 1134, 32 I.L.M. at 646. Article 1121's
exception for injunctive, declaratory, or other extraordinary relief is similar to Article
IX(3)(b) of the 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, although the latter is
narrower, referring only to injunctive relief. See 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Art. IX(3)(b), reprinted in COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 33,
at 261.
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Eleven. Annex 1120.1 states that with respect to Mexico an investor
may not raise its Chapter Eleven claims both before Mexican courts
and before a NAFTA tribunal.' This prohibition seems to apply even
to suits brought prior to the Chapter Eleven claim69 and to suits for
declaratory and injunctive relief permitted by Article 1121.70 The
United States and Canada go even further. Their implementing
legislation for NAFTA says that private parties may not raise
violations of NAFTA in domestic courts at all." This represents a
sort of forced claim splitting. A foreign investor in the United States
or Canada who wishes to challenge a measure as both a violation of
domestic law and Chapter Eleven must raise its domestic law claims
in domestic court' and its NAFTA claims in arbitration.73
68. NAFTA, Annex 1120.1(a), 32 I.L.M. at 648 ("an investor of another Party
may not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under [NAFTA] ... both in
an arbitration under this Section and in proceedings before a Mexican court or
administrative tribunal.... ."). Subsection (b) further provides that an investor may
not allege a breach of NAFTA in arbitration under Chapter Eleven if an enterprise
that it owns or controls has alleged that breach in proceedings before a Mexican
court or administrative tribunal. Id. Annex 1120.1(b), 32 I.L.M. at 648.
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3312(c)(2) (1993) ("No person other than the United States...
may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States,
any State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or
inaction is inconsistent with the [NAFTA] .... "); North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act § 6(2), 1993 Consolidated Statutes of Canada, c. 44
("Subject to Section B of Chapter Eleven of the Agreement, no person has any cause
of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without the consent of the
Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is
claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement.").
72. Articles 1116 and 1117 allow foreign investors to submit to arbitration only
violations of Chapter Eleven Section A. NAFTA, Arts. 1116-1117, 32 I.L.M. at 642-
43. Thus, unless a violation of domestic law also constitutes a violation of Chapter
Eleven (such as denial of national treatment, most-favored nation treatment,
treatment in accordance with international law, or expropriation), the tribunal will
lack jurisdiction over the domestic law claims. Cf FREEMAN, supra note 55, at 317-22
(noting that States are not internationally responsible for ordinary errors of the
courts in applying local law).
73. To the extent that the domestic legal system permits suits under customary
international law, a foreign investor could presumably challenge the measure as a
violation of customary international law (e.g. expropriation) in domestic court. A
Canadian or Mexican investor's suit against the United States on such a theory
would, however, likely be barred on grounds of sovereign immunity. See Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (holding that
Nicaraguan plaintiffs' damages suit against U.S. officials for violations of
international law was barred by sovereign immunity).
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Article 1121, Annex 1120.1, and the U.S. and Canadian
implementing legislation thus appear to give a foreign investor with
both domestic law and NAFrA claims a menu of options: (1) it can
seek damages (or declaratory or injunctive relief) in domestic court
on domestic law grounds and subsequently bring Chapter Eleven
claim for damages before a NAFTA tribunal; (2) in Mexico, it can
seek damages (or declaratory or injunctive relief) in domestic court
on domestic law and NAFTA grounds, but will then be barred from
bringing a Chapter Eleven claim before a NAFTA tribunal; (3) it can
bring a Chapter Eleven claim for damages before a NAFTA tribunal
immediately, but must waive its right to seek damages in domestic
court on domestic law grounds; or (4) it can bring a Chapter Eleven
claim for damages before a NAFrA tribunal immediately and
simultaneously or subsequently seek declaratory or injunctive relief in
domestic court on domestic law grounds. The next question is the
extent to which the local remedies rule and the doctrine of res
judicata might operate to limit those options.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies Under Chapter Eleven
As we have seen, customary international law required an
injured alien to exhaust local remedies before either it or its
government could bring a claim before an international tribunal, but
this rule could be waived by international agreement.74 The question,
then, is whether Chapter Eleven waives the local remedies rule.75
Chapter Eleven does not speak as clearly to this question as
some other agreements do. It does not provide for the settlement of
investment disputes by international arbitration "to the exclusion of
any other remedy" or that a State wishing to require the exhaustion
of local remedies must do so expressly, as Article 26 of the ICSID
Convention does.7 Nor does it provide that a foreign investor who
seeks relief in domestic courts is barred from bringing an
74. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
75. At least one author has concluded that it does not. See Steve Tidrick,
Exhaustion of Local Remedies as a Prerequisite to NAFTA Claims Brought by
Foreign Investors Against Nations (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
As this Article was going to press, the Chapter Eleven tribunal in Metalclad
Corporation v. Mexico ruled that Chapter Eleven does not require the exhaustion of
local remedies. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico at 31, n. 4 (Aug. 30,2000) (on file with
the author).
76. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 26, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4
I.L.M. 532 (1965); see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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international arbitral claim, as the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaties have.' Indeed, Article 1121 seems to contemplate that a
foreign investor is permitted to bring a domestic court suit before
bringing a Chapter Eleven claim, 8 so perhaps it should be required to
do so.
However, as with the Iran-U.S. Claims Settlement Declaration,
the express mention of domestic courts in Article 1121 without any
express requirement of exhaustion suggests by negative implication
that exhaustion is not required.79  Chapter Eleven is thus
distinguishable from the U.S.-Italy Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaty at issue in the ELSI Case, which made no mention
of domestic courts at all.' Even if one reads the ELSI Case to require
some affirmative words waiving the local remedies rule,81 such words
seem to be provided by Article 1121's requirement that a foreign
investor waive its "right to initiate or continue" proceedings in
domestic court.' This phrase strongly suggests that an investor is not
required to complete any suit it may have filed in domestic court or
even to initiate one at all before bringing its claims before a NAFTA
tribunal.'
The conclusion that Article 1121 waives the local remedies rule is
strengthened by three other arguments. First, Article 1115 states that
the purpose of Chapter Eleven, Section B is to "establish[] a
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures
77. See 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. IX(2), reprinted in
COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 33, at 261; 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, Art. VI(3)(a)(ii), reprinted in 1 ZAMORA & BRAND, supra note 35, at 659-60;
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
81. See Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989
I.C.J. 15, 42 (July 20) ("[T]he Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important
principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly
dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so.").
82. NAFTA, Arts. 1121(1)(b) & (2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 643.
83. One author has argued that although Article 1121 requires the foreign
investor to waive its "right" to go to local court, it does not relieve the foreign
investor of its "responsibility" to exhaust local remedies before bringing an
international claim. See Tidrick, supra note 75, at 53, 58. The problem with this
reading is that it renders the waiver requirement redundant. If a foreign investor
were required to exhaust its domestic remedies before bringing a NAFrA claim,
domestic law principles of res judicata would bar relitigation of the domestic law
claims and thus no prospective waiver of the right to seek redress in domestic court
would be necessary.
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both equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance
with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before
an impartial tribunal."' Although requiring the exhaustion of local
remedies would not necessarily deny access to "an impartial
tribunal," it would clearly delay that access, which one might
conclude is at least in tension with the purpose expressed in Article
1115. Second, Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) bar a foreign investor
from bringing a NAFTA claim if more than three years have elapsed
since the foreign investor knew or ought to have known of the alleged
breach of Chapter Eleven and the damage to its investment.' There
is no provision for tolling this requirement while the foreign investor
pursues its rights in domestic court, which one might have expected if
the exhaustion of local remedies were required. Third, the practice of
the NAFTA Parties shows that they do not regard the exhaustion of
local remedies as a prerequisite to bringing claims before a NAFTA
tribunal. To date, the respondent States in Chapter Eleven
proceedings have tended not to raise the local remedies rule as a
defense."
Thus, it appears that the best reading of Article 1121 is that it
allows a foreign investor to bring a Chapter Eleven claim without
84. NAFrA, Art. 1115,32 I.L.M. at 642.
85. Id. Arts. 1116(2) & 1117(2), 32 I.L.M. 643.
86. Canada did not raise the local remedies rule as a defense in either the Ethyl
case or the S.D. Myers case. See Statement of Defense at 9-12, Ethyl Corp. v. Canada
(on file with the author) (arguing inter alia that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction
because claimant had not delivered the required consent and waivers, because
proposed legislation was not a "measure," and because claimant filed within six
months of event giving rise to claim, but not because Ethyl had failed to exhaust its
remedies in Canadian courts); Statement of Defense at 10-11, S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada (on file with the author) (arguing inter alia that claimant had not made an
"investment" in Canada and the Canadian order at issue was not a measure "relating
to" investors or investments, but not that claimant had failed to exhaust its remedies
in Canadian courts). In the Azinian case, claimants had filed suit in Mexican courts,
see infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text, but it is not clear they had completely
exhausted their local remedies. However, Mexico did not raise the local remedies
rule as a defense. See Counter Memorial of Respondent at 48-54, Azinian v. Mexico,
14 ICSID REv. FOR. INv. LJ. 535 (1999) (on file with the author) (arguing inter alia
that claimants had not made an "investment" in Mexico, but not that claimants had
failed to exhaust their remedies in Mexican courts).
It is possible that the United States will raise the local remedies rule as a
defense in the Loewen case. See Notice of Claim, Exhibit A (opinion of Sir Robert
Y. Jennings, Q.C.) at 14-15, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (on file with the
author) (anticipating the defense of failure to exhaust local remedies). The United
States' Counter Memorial on Jurisdiction was filed on February 18, 2000, but has not
yet been made public.
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exhausting its domestic remedies.' Article 1121 certainly permits a
foreign investor to seek damages, an injunction, or declaratory relief
in domestic court prior to bringing a NAFTA claim but does not
require it to do so. At any point within the three-year period set by
Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2), the foreign investor may choose to
waive its "right to initiate or continue"' the domestic court
proceedings for damages and bring a Chapter Eleven claim instead.
B. Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven
The next question is what effect the doctrine of res judicata has
on a foreign investor's options under Chapter Eleven. It is certainly
possible that, if a foreign investor seeks relief in domestic court
(either in a prior Suit for damages or a simultaneous suit for
declaratory or injunctive relief), that domestic court might reach a
judgment before the Chapter Eleven tribunal renders its award. It is
unlikely that the domestic court will have reached the question of
whether Chapter Eleven itself has been breached, because U.S. and
Canadian laws preclude a foreign investor from raising its NAFTA
claims before a domestic court, and NAFTA Annex 1120.1 will likely
discourage foreign investors from raising such claims before Mexican
courts.Y However, the domestic court may have decided issues of fact
or domestic law that bear on the foreign investor's NAFTA claims,
raising the possibility of issue preclusion if the doctrine of res
judicata were to apply.
The facts of Azinian v. Mexico91 provide a useful illustration.
87. My conclusion that Chapter Eleven does not require the exhaustion of
domestic remedies is limited to exhaustion as a procedural requirement. For some
Chapter Eleven claims, like denial of justice, the exhaustion of local remedies may be
a substantive requirement of the claim. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 47, at 179
("where the international unlawful act consists in the remedial organs of the State
failing to comply with the requirements of international law to provide redress for
private wrongs suffered within its jurisdiction ... the international unlawful act does
not arise unless there is an established failure of local remedies"); FREEMAN, supra
note 55, at 407 (noting that for denial of justice claims, the local remedies rule
"enjoys the substantive faculty of creating responsibility where local remedies
function defectively"). That issue, however, lies beyond the scope of this article. For
further discussion of the substance/procedure distinction and the local remedies rule,
see AMERASINGHE, supra note 19, at 319-58; J.E.S. Fawcett, The Exhaustion of Local
Remedies: Substance or Procedure?, 31 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 452 (1954).
88. NAFTA, Arts. 1121(1)(b) & (2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 643.
89. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
91. Azinian v. Mexico, 14 ICSID Rnv. FOR. INV. L.J. 535 (1999). The tribunal
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The claimants in Azinian were investors in DESONA, a Mexican
company that had entered a concession contract with the city of
Naucalpan on November 15, 1993 to provide waste collection
services.' On January 1, 1994, a new administration took over the
government of Naucalpan and, on March 21, decided to annul the
concession contract.93  DESONA brought suit in the State
Administrative Tribunal, seeking to have the annulment set aside and
the concession contract reinstated, but the Administrative Tribunal
upheld the annulment on the grounds of 27 irregularities in the
conclusion and performance of the contract. 4 The Superior Chamber
of the Administrative Tribunal sustained this decision on the basis of
nine of the irregularities (seven of which involved alleged
misrepresentations to the Naucalpan City Council), and the Federal
Circuit Court rejected DESONA's amparo petition.95 The claimants
then brought claims on behalf of themselves and on behalf of
DESONA under Chapter Eleven, arguing that their contractual
rights under the concession contract had been expropriated by
Naucalpan's annulment of the agreement.' Obviously, the Mexican
courts' factual determinations that the concession contract had been
induced by fraud and its legal conclusion that the contract was not
valid under Mexican law were relevant to the claimants' Chapter
was composed of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Claus von Wobeser, and Jan Paulsson
(President).
92. Id. at 542.
93. Id. at 542-43.
94. Id. at 543.
95. Id. The amparo proceeding may used to review the actions of public
authorities, including courts. For further discussion of amparo, see the articles in the
symposium on amparo beginning at 6 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 35 (1998). See also RIcHARD D.
BAKER, JuDIcIAL REvIEw IN MEXIco: A STUDY OF THE AMPARo Surr (1971);
Hector Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 306 (1979); Helen L. Clagett, The Mexican Suit of Amparo, 33 GEo. L.J.
418 (1945).
96. It is well established that repudiation of a concession agreement can
constitute an expropriation of contractual rights. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co.
Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 106 (1989); Starrett
Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 230
(1987); Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (1977), 20 I.L.M. 1, 53
(1981); Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guat.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1079,1097 (1929); Certain German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 44
(May 25); Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R.I.A.A. 307, 334 (1922).
The Azinian tribunal did not dispute this. It observed that a mere breach of the
concession contract by Naucalpan would not be an expropriation, Azinian, 14 ICSID
Ruv. FOR. INv. L.J. at 564, but proceeded to consider whether the annulment of the
concession agreement was an expropriation. Id. at 565-74.
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Eleven claims, for if the contract were invalid then there would be no
contractual rights to be expropriated. Thus, the question of what
effect the Mexican court decisions should be given was critical in
Azinian.
Unfortunately, the Azinian tribunal's discussion of this question
is not entirely clear. Initially, the tribunal seemed to acknowledge
that it was not bound by the decisions of the Mexican courts. "[T]he
fact that the Claimants took the initiative before the Mexican courts,"
the tribunal wrote, is not "fatal to the jurisdiction of the present
Arbitral Tribunal. The Claimants have cited a number of cases where
international arbitral tribunals did not consider themselves bound by
decisions of national courts."'  After quoting Amco v. Indonesian to
this effect, the tribunal continued: "As the Claimants argue
persuasively, it would be unfortunate if potential claimants under
NAFTA were dissuaded from seeking relief under domestic law from
national courts, because such actions might have the salutary effect of
resolving the dispute without resorting to investor-state arbitration
under NAFTA."'  Yet, later in the award, the tribunal seemed to
take the position that the decisions of the Mexican courts upholding
the annulment of the concession contract could not be questioned
unless those court decisions themselves constituted a denial of justice
that violated Chapter Eleven."° In the end, though, the tribunal made
97. Azinian, 14 ICSID REv. FOR. INv. L.J. at 564.
98. Amco v. Indonesia (Award, Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413, 460 (1993),
sustained in relevant part, Amco v. Indonesia (Decision on the Application for
Annulment, May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509, 526-27 (1993) ("an international
tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a national court.").
99. Azinian, 14 ICSID REv. FOR. INV. L.J. at 564.
100. Id. at 566 ("How can it be said that Mexico breached NAFrA when the
Ayuntamiento of Naucalpan purported to declare the invalidity of a Concession
Contract which by its terms was subject to Mexican law, and to the jurisdiction of the
Mexican courts, and the courts of Mexico then agreed with the Ayuntamiento's
decision?... A governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a
manner validated by its courts unless the courts themselves are disavowed at the
international level. As the Mexican courts found that the Ayuntamiento's decision to
nullify the Concession Contract was consistent with the Mexican law governing the
validity of public service concessions, the question is whether the Mexican court
decisions themselves breached Mexico's obligations under Chapter Eleven."); see
also id. at 568 ("What must be shown is that the court decision itself constitutes a
violation of the treaty .... [T]he Claimants must show either a denial of justice or a
pretense of form to achieve an internationally unlawful end.").
The dissenting arbitrator in Waste Management Inc. v. Mexico, also assumed
that a domestic court decision would bind a Chapter Eleven tribunal as res judicata
unless that decision constituted a denial of justice. See Waste Management, Inc. v.
Mexico at 18 (dissenting opinion of Keith Highet) (June 2, 2000) (visited Aug. 15,
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its own determination that the concession contract had been induced
by fraud, rendering its prior discussions of the res judicata question
dictum.'0'
How, then, should future NAFTA tribunals treat the decisions of
domestic courts? The text of Chapter Eleven does not address this
issue. Because Article 1131(1) directs NAFTA tribunals to "decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and
applicable rules of international law,""' one might suppose that a
NAFTA tribunal should apply the traditional customary international
law rule that the decisions of domestic courts are not binding on
international tribunals." However, the customary international law
rule was developed under circumstances that are quite different from
those of Chapter Eleven, and the reasons supporting the traditional
rule do not seem to apply in the Chapter Eleven context.
One of the reasons international tribunals have refused to give
res judicata effect to the decisions of domestic courts is because the
parties in the international proceeding were different.' Because
Chapter Eleven allows a foreign investor to bring an arbitral claim
directly against a host State, however, the parties to a Chapter Eleven
2000) <http:lwww.worldbank.orglicsidlcases/publicationaward.pdf>, 15 ICSID REv.
FOR. INv. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2000) ("to the extent that the local remedies were
unavailing.... the NAFTA claimant's basis of claim against the contesting
government would... be reduced by application of the res judicata of the
unfavorable local result unless, and to the extent that, such unfavorable local result
were to be considered itself as an international denial of justice").
101. Id. at 569-74. Even if the Azinian tribunal's discussion of res judicata were
not dictum, it would not technically bind future NAFTA tribunals. Article 1136(1)
provides that "[ain award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except
between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case." NAFI'A, Art.
1136(1), 32 I.L.M. at 646. The Permanent Court of International Justice interpreted
a similar provision in Article 59 of its Statute as rejecting a system of binding
precedent. See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.),
1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25) ("The object of [Article 59] is simply to
prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case from being binding
upon other States or in other disputes."). See generally BROWNLiE, supra note 55, at
20-22. But see Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico at 1 (dissenting opinion
of Keith Highet) (June 2, 2000), (visited Aug. 15, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/publicationaward.pdf>, 15 ICSID Rav. FOR.
INv. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2000) (stating that "[t]he precedential significance of
this Award for future proceedings under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) cannot be underestimated").
102. NAFTA, Art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (emphasis added).
103. For discussion of the customary international law rule, see supra pt. I.B.
104. See, e.g., Affaire des Chemins de Fer de Buzau-Nehoiasi (Germ. v. Rom.), 3
R.I.A.A. 1827, 1836 (1939). For further discussion, see supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
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arbitration will typically be the same as the parties to the domestic
lawsuit. Another reason for the traditional rule was that the issues
raised in the international and domestic proceedings were different,"0
sometimes stated more generally as the dualism of international and
domestic law.Y Certainly the ultimate question in a Chapter Eleven
proceeding (whether there has been a violation of NAFTA) will
typically be different from the ultimate question in a domestic
proceeding (whether there has been a violation of domestic law)."
But, as the Azinian case demonstrates,10' there can easily be questions
of fact and of law that are common to both proceedings.
Nor can a rule against res judicata be justified as a necessary
companion to the local remedies rule." I have argued above that
Chapter Eleven does not require a foreign investor to exhaust
domestic remedies before bringing its claim before a NAFTA
tribunal."' One could, therefore, adopt a rule giving res judicata
effect to domestic court decisions under Chapter Eleven without
having the effect of denying foreign investors access to an
international forum. The foreign investor could avoid potentially
being bound by an adverse domestic court decision simply by
foregoing its option to sue in domestic court and bringing its claim
immediately before a NAFTA tribunal."'
Of the traditional reasons for declining to give a domestic court
decision res judicata effect, that leaves only the domestic court's
possible lack of impartiality, or, in the words of the Amco tribunal,
the fact that "[o]ne of the reasons for instituting an international
arbitration procedure is precisely that parties-rightly or wrongly-
feel often more confident with a legal institution which is not entirely
related to one of the parties.""' This reason is consistent with Article
105. See, e.g., In re S.S. Newchwang (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 324
(1922). For further discussion, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., CHENG, supra note 47, at 337, n.6. For further discussion, see supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
110. See supra pt. II.A.
111. Obviously, this analysis applies only to suits initiated by the foreign investor.
If a NAFrA tribunal were to treat the decision in a suit initiated by the host State as
res judicata, the foreign investor might indeed be effectively barred from bringing its
Chapter Eleven claim.
112. Amco v. Indonesia (Award, Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413, 460 (1993),
sustained in relevant part, Amco v. Indonesia (Decision on the Application for
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1115 of NAFTA, which states that one of the purposes of Chapter
Eleven's dispute resolution provisions is to assure "due process
before an impartial tribunal."113 But so long as the foreign investor
could avoid the res judicata effects of a domestic court decision by
choosing not to bring suit in domestic court in the first place, a rule of
res judicata will not deny the foreign investor access to "an impartial
tribunal." And if the foreign investor chooses to bring its suit before
a potentially biased domestic court, it should arguably have to live
with the results.
In short, none of the traditional reasons for the rule against
giving domestic court judgments res judicata effect seem to fit the
Chapter Eleven context. There is, however, an alternative reason for
adhering to the traditional rule in the context of Chapter Eleven. A
rule granting res judicata effect to the decision of a domestic court is
likely to deter foreign investors from trying to resolve their disputes
with the host State in domestic court, since they can reasonably
expect such courts to be less impartial than a NAFTA tribunal."4
Such a result would deprive the host State of an opportunity to
redress the alleged injury before the dispute is elevated to the
international plane."5 As noted above in connection with the local
remedies rule, resolution of disputes in domestic court tends to
benefit the host State because it tends to be less expensive and
attracts less publicity than international arbitration.'16 Indeed, this
argument against res judicata is closely related to the argument for
the local remedies rule: that it is better to resolve investment disputes
locally if possible."'
It is reasonable to assume that such considerations were what
motivated Canada, Mexico, and the United States to draft Article
1121 as they did. In particular, it explains why Article 1121 would
Annulment, May 16,1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509,526-27 (1993).
113. NAFTA, Art. 1115,32 I.L.M. at 642.
114. See Amco, 1 ICSID Rep. at 460.
115. Even the Azinian tribunal thought that such a result would be "unfortunate."
Azinian, 14 ICSID REv. FOR. INV. L.J. at 564. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. I have argued above, see supra pt. H.A., that the local remedies rule does not
apply to Chapter Eleven claims not because I consider the argument that investment
disputes should be resolved locally inapplicable but rather because the text of
NAFTA Article 1121 seems to me to require a different result. The text of Chapter
Eleven does not, by contrast, speak to the issue of res judicata, leaving more room for
arguments based on policy.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
permit a foreign investor to bring a claim in domestic court and
subsequently to bring a claim before a NAFTA tribunal but not the
reverse." It is worth emphasizing that this aspect of Article 1121 is in
sharp contrast to the dispute resolution provisions of U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties, which typically require a foreign investor at the
outset to choose either international arbitration or domestic court.1 9
If Chapter Eleven tribunals were to give domestic court decisions res
judicata effect, they would effectively create a system in which foreign
investors were forced to choose between domestic court and
international arbitration, a model that the NAFTA negotiators seem
to have deliberately rejected.
Nor are the traditional arguments in favor of res judicata
particularly persuasive here. Res judicata is designed both to protect
a defendant from the burden of having to relitigate issues that have
already been decided and to conserve judicial resources."' In the
Chapter Eleven context, however, the only possible "defendants" are
the governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States. They
should be free to choose to bear the burden of relitigating some issues
as the price of encouraging the resolution of some investment
disputes in domestic court. And in the Chapter Eleven context, the
cost of relitigating issues does not fall on a publicly supported and
overburdened court system but rather on arbitrators, who serve
voluntarily and are compensated by the parties (often quite
handsomely).
In short, Chapter Eleven tribunals should adhere to the
traditional customary international law rule that the decisions of
domestic courts are not biding on them as res judicata, not because
the parties or the issues are different, not because of doubts about the
impartiality of domestic courts or as a corollary of the local remedies
rule, but rather to encourage foreign investors to pursue their
remedies in domestic court in the hopes that at least some investment
118. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. Once a foreign investor has
brought a Chapter Eleven claim, the host State has little to gain from allowing a
subsequent domestic suit for damages. Fairness to the foreign investor seems to
support Article 1121's exception for declaratory and injunctive relief, on the other
hand, since a Chapter Eleven tribunal lacks authority to grant such remedies. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
120. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) ("Collateral
estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.").
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disputes may be resolved at the local level. Future tribunals should
reject the Azinian tribunal's dictum that domestic court decisions can
only be questioned if they constitute a denial of justice.. in favor of a
rule that permits the relitigation of the same issues decided by
domestic courts. Alternatively, Canada, Mexico, and the United
States should consider exercising their authority under Article
1131(2) to issue an interpretation of Article 1121 providing that the
decisions of domestic courts shall not be binding on Chapter Eleven
tribunals.m
IH. Conclusion
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA breaks new ground in permitting
foreign investors to seek relief both in domestic court and before an
international arbitral tribunal. It is this unique aspect of Chapter
Eleven that raises new and difficult questions about the proper
relationship between national courts and international arbitration.
Chapter Eleven must, of course, be read against the background of
the customary international law rules on exhaustion of remedies and
res judicata, but in so doing one must also attend carefully to the
language of Chapter Eleven and be attuned to the possibility that
traditional international law rules developed in a different context
might need to be modified, or might at least require a different
justification, to fit NAFTA.
I have argued that Chapter Eleven waives the customary
international law rule requiring a foreign investor to exhaust its local
remedies before bringing a claim before an international tribunal.
Chapter Eleven permits a foreign investor to bring its claims before a
NAFTA tribunal immediately if it so chooses. But I have also argued
that Chapter Eleven tries to encourage foreign investors to seek relief
in domestic courts first and that NAFTA tribunals should not,
therefore, treat domestic court decisions as res judicata for fear of
discouraging investors from doing so.
121. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
122. Article 1131(2) provides that "[a]n interpretation by the Commission of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this
Section." NAFTA, Art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 645. This allows Canada, Mexico, and
the United States to revise Chapter Eleven without the need formally to amend
NAFTA.

